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In the study of oral-formulaic performance the formula has always 
been understood as playing a pivotal role (Lord 1960, Foley 1995).  But 
although it is clearly a linguistic unit, the technical study of formulae by 
linguists has been slight.  This paper intends to remedy this lack by 
proposing some linguistic theories as to the nature of the formula.  They will 
take the form of formal and testable proposals.  By formal I mean 
mathematically modelled. 
Why place such a study before the readers of Oral Tradition?  Two 
preliminary observations are in order.  First, it has become clear over the last 
twenty years that the use of formulae is not restricted to the performance of 
oral literature (Edwards and Sienkewicz 1990).  The theories developed 
below draw on the study of vernacular oral traditions and specifically on the 
author’s work on some of these traditions (Kuiper 1996).  It is not intended 
that this should be a slight on the work of others.  It is just that mine is the 
only work I know of that looks at formulae from a technical perspective (cp. 
Pawley 1991 and 1992).  However, the theories proposed are intended to 
generalize to formulaic speech used for the performance of oral literature.1  
Second, the work being attempted here is essentially cross-
disciplinary between the post-Lord study of formulaic literature and the 
linguistic study of formulaic speech.  As such it attempts to explain the 
properties of formulae via formalisms used in linguistics.  The cost of this is 
that such formalisms may not be familiar to a number of the scholars 
working on formulaic speech within a more literary or ethnographic 
tradition.  However, it should be clear that formulae are linguistic units and 
as such the formalisms of linguistics are appropriate, not to say, the 
appropriate tools with which to study the linguistic properties of formulae.  
While there are some costs for scholars who may be unfamiliar with 
contemporary linguistics in understanding what such tools have to offer, the 
                                           
1 The literature relating to this field is summarized in Foley 1988 and 1990. 
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benefits of cross-disciplinary study are that the approach taken by another 
discipline has the potential to illuminate aspects of the phenomena under 
study that are not available elsewhere.  Since those who are most interested 
in oral-formulaic traditions have the most to gain, I present the material 
below in the hope that it does illuminate aspects of the formula and 
formulaic speech that have been left rather in the dark. 
 
 
Some Preliminary Distinctions 
 
Since the formula has a multifaceted character, understanding the 
formula as linguistic unit requires making a number of distinctions 
commonly drawn in linguistics.  It is, first, part of the internalized linguistic 
resources of a speaker, the speaker’s linguistic competence (Chomsky 1965), 
the speaker’s I (for internalized) language (1986).  Second, it is part of a 
linguistic tradition; that is, it is a social fact, a unit of a language external to 
a single individual, what Chomsky calls an E language (1986).  Third, it is a 
unit used in speech, what Chomsky terms performance (1965).  Chomskian 
performance with a small “p” needs to be distinguished from performance 
with a capital “P,” the object of study of performance theorists such as 
Bauman (1986).  To understand the nature of the formula involves looking at 
all three of these aspects of the formula.   
 
 
Internal Constraints: The Role of Memory in Performance 
 
Our aim is to understand both how formulae are stored and retrieved 
from memory and how they are used in the production of speech.  We will 
suppose that one critical function of formulae is to limit the linguistic 
resources of a speaker when that speaker’s working memory is under 
pressure.  This idea, at least in embryo, goes back to Lord: “The singer’s 
mode of composition is dictated by the demands of performance at high 
speed” (1960:65).  I will assume that high speed performance makes greater 
demands on working memory than slower speech does.  The support for that 
view will require some unraveling. 
One of the oldest concerns in the modern study of linguistic 
performance—the way humans use language in speech—is the impact of 
human memory on performance.  Miller and Chomsky (1963) showed that 
while syntactic center embedding in sentences such as “The boy the man the 
people loved saw died” is grammatical, that is, allowable by the rules of 
grammatical competence; nevertheless, people cannot understand the 
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grammatical structure of such a sentence when it is spoken.  This is because 
human beings have a limited short-term or working memory.  Center 
embedded structures require that earlier syntactic constituents of sentences 
are remembered while later units are being processed.  When the depth of 
center embedding gets down below two levels, human working memory 
capacity gives up.  However, people can decipher such a sentence when 
given a pencil and paper, since with that support nothing is required to 
remain in working memory.  It can all be written down.  This experiment 
shows that the shortfall from which the problem stems is not the speaker’s 
knowledge of the structural properties of his or her grammar. 
The hypothesis that human working memory is quite limited is now 
well established.  George Miller (1956) suggests that its size is seven plus or 
minus two chunks.  A “chunk,” roughly speaking, is a structured set of 
information that has a single address in memory.  It appears that human 
beings can only access instantaneously—that is, hold in working memory— 
between five and nine of such chunks.  That may be a slightly low estimate 
but it is close enough for our purposes.2  Frazier and Clifton (1996) and 
Marcus (1980), for instance, base their theories of human ability to 
reconstruct the grammatical structure of sentences while they are heard on 
the assumption of a limited working memory. 
Suppose, following Newell and Simon (1972) and Baddeley (1990), 
that human beings have at least two kinds of memory: long-term or 
encyclopedic memory, and short-term or working memory.  Everything that 
we remember and can later recall from memory is placed in long-term 
memory, which has the following relevant properties: it is unfillable in a 
finite lifetime and recall from it is normally rapid.  Human working memory 
is a much smaller memory store where chunks of information are held while 
they are being used for some kind of processing.  For example, in order to 
use in a sentence the information that someone was born in 1918, that fact 
must first be recalled from long-term memory and placed in working 
memory so that it can be given linguistic form.  To recall a face, we first 
need to extract a representation of it from long-term memory and then make 
it accessible by placing it in working memory.   
The use of working memory in sentence production can be seen 
clearly when we look at how a speaker goes about constructing a simple 
sentence such as the following: “The woman who owned the store has 
decided to return, hasn’t she?”  In order to produce this sentence in the 
correct grammatical form, the speaker must remember a number of chunks 
of grammatical information, including the following: 
                                           
2 See Baddeley 1990 for an account of human memory.  
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1.   the number, person, and gender of the subject of the sentence 
2. the fact that there is no negative after the first auxiliary verb in the 
      main clause of the sentence 
3.   the tense of the first auxiliary verb 
4.   the first auxiliary verb itself 
 
The first chunk of information has to be kept in short-term memory because 
the form of the first auxiliary verb have depends on it.  In the case of a third 
person singular subject, the present tense auxiliary will be has and not have.  
This chunk must also be retained in working memory because the final 
pronoun in the sentence gains its form from this information.  The second 
chunk of information must be held in working memory because the tag 
question that follows the comma at the end of the sentence will have a 
negative if the statement preceding it does not, and vice versa.  The third 
chunk of information must be remembered because the tense of the tag 
question must match it.  The same goes for the first auxiliary verb.  Note 
also that the part of the sentence between the fourth chunk of information 
and the point in the sentence where the information is required is of 
indeterminate length.  However, because sentences are grammatically 
planned, all this must be held in working memory pending its potential use.   
The conclusion we can therefore draw is that speakers who are 
producing novel utterances must have a reasonable portion of working 
memory available in order to be able to speak.  Oral-formulaic performers 
also have need of working memory resources to be singers of tales.  
Producing metrical lines of poetry at speed like those sung by the South 
Slavic guslari studied by Lord requires memory resources.  The poet, for 
example, must, at any stage during the production of the poem, know where 
he is within the structure of the whole as well as keep a live, mobile 
audience interested in the performance.  It thus seems that memory resources 
in addition to those of “normal” speech are required if we are to suppose that 
oral poets make everything up from scratch.  After Lord’s work, that is no 
longer supposed.  In what follows I intend to explain what makes it possible, 
psychologically, for oral-formulaic performers to speak given the kind of 
pressure that they are under. 
Memory constraints are only one internal constraint on performance.  
Speech must be constructed in such a way as to be intentional.  Speakers 
have intentions in speaking, and endeavor, by speaking, to have hearers infer 
those intentions (Sperber and Wilson 1986).  A great deal of speech 
production must also be automatic, since speakers, having made up their 
minds what they wish to say, must leave the brain to get on with low-level 
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(albeit complex) processes such as articulation without interference.  This 
allows them to get on with planning the next unit of speech.   
Speech production must also be compositional since the whole of 
what is said must be made out of parts.  Levelt (1989) supposes that speech 
is composed in a lockstep fashion, starting with speaker’s intentions and 
followed by the selection of an appropriate message representation of what 
the speaker wishes to say.  The required words are then selected.  The words 
in turn structure the syntactic sequence the speaker is going to produce.  The 
syntactic sequence of words is then related to the articulatory sequences in 
which the sentence is spoken.  Such a process is both compositional and 
analytical.  It is analytical in that the speaker breaks down his or her 
intentions into the words that are required to give form to those 
communicative intentions.  It is compositional in that it supposes that 
speakers create utterances, as it were from the ground up, out of words.   
Levelt also supposes that speech is constructed by a series of parallel 
processes that are relatively autonomous (1989:14).  Each processor accepts 
information from others but carries on its work independently.  This order is 
necessary to ensure that there are not long stretches of waiting while one 
processor—for example, the one that constructs the surface form of the 
sentence—finishes its work before the one that looks after the pronunciation 
of the sentence can get started.  If an understanding of oral-formulaic speech 
is to have any firm explanatory force, then in at least some of these areas of 
internal constraint, oral-formulaic speech must create a more efficient way 
of speaking when speakers, including the performers of oral literature, are 
subject to heavy working memory loading.  
Recall that I am assuming that all oral performers are under some 
degree of working memory constraint and, following Lord (1960) and 
Kuiper (1996), that those who perform oral heroic poetry and, for example, 
the commentaries of fast sports and rapid auctions are under a greater than 
normal degree of such constraint.  Thus I further assume that they will seek 
means of reducing their linguistic options, that is, their search space in 
memory, as they speak.  After looking at the formal properties of oral-
formulaic speech we will be in a position to see how the linguistic resources 
used by oral-formulaic performers make that possible. 
 
 
External Constraints on Performance: Routine Contexts 
 
Much of living in a society involves interacting with other people in 
predictable ways.  Not all of what we do needs to be predictable in every 
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respect, but much of it must be to some degree.  The linguist Charles 
Ferguson describes an interesting experiment (1976:140): 
 
To see what the result would be, I simply did not reply verbally to her [his 
secretary’s] good morning.  Instead I smiled in a friendly way and through 
the next day behaved as usual.  The next morning I did the same thing.  
The second day was full of tension.  I got strange looks not only from the 
secretary but from several others on the staff, and there was a definite air 
of “What’s the matter with Ferguson?”  I abandoned the experiment on the 
third day because I was afraid of the explosion and the lasting 
consequences.  
 
Experiments like this can be conducted in a wide variety of contexts.  
For example, a caller on the telephone can become very disconcerted if the 
person picking up the receiver does not say anything.  (Very young children, 
for example, do this.)  The discomfort comes about because, in our society, 
the person answering the call is supposed to announce himself or herself 
somehow.  It is a social convention.  There is a large literature on such social 
conventions, and this is not the place to summarize it.  But I will assume, 
and with good cause, that there are conventions that order the way social 
events are perceived and the way social life is conducted.  Sometimes there 
is a measure of freedom within such conventions (Chomsky 1988:5): “The 
normal use of language is thus free and undetermined but yet appropriate to 
situations; and it is recognized as appropriate by other participants in the 
discourse situation who might have reacted in similar ways and whose 
thoughts, evoked by this discourse, correspond to those of the speaker.”  But 
in many circumstances we have little option as enculturated human beings 
but to do and say what our culture constrains us to do and say, and speech 
itself, taking the specific forms that it does, structures our social realities.   
Oral-formulaic performance could be a factor in providing an 
explanation of the way in which speech is matched with context.   Again, 
after looking in detail at the nature of oral-formulaic performance we will be 
able to see how this is so.  In summary, an oral-formulaic performer, like 
anyone who is speaking, is subject to constraints from two sources: his or 
her internal psychological limitations, and limitations placed on the speaker 
as a result of being an enculturated human being who is required to behave 
in culturally sanctioned ways in order to be considered a native of the culture 
they inhabit.  The kinds of discourse that such performers enact create a 
special role for formulae.  Formulae may therefore be a response to the two 
kinds of constraints on performance discussed so far.  To illustrate this 
dynamics will be the burden of what follows. 
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Discourse Structure Rules 
 
In early studies of formulaic speech, pioneers like Parry and Lord note 
that the oral poems they study contain certain themes.  What they mean by 
themes is not precisely defined.  Lord’s definition and description of themes 
will suffice as a starting point:  
 
I have called the groups of ideas regularly used in telling a tale in the formulaic 
style of traditional song the “themes” of the poetry (Lord 1960:68).  
 
Although he [the singer] thinks of the theme as a unit, it can be broken down into 
smaller parts: the receipt of the letter, the summoning of the council, and so forth 
(71). 
 
Although the themes lead naturally from one to another to form a song which 
exists as a whole in the singer’s mind with Aristotelian beginning, middle, and 
end, the units within this whole, the themes, have a semi-independent life of their 
own.  The theme in oral poetry exists at one and the same time in and for itself 
and for the whole song (94). 
 
 
It seems that themes have two aspects.  One is internal form.  Themes 
deal with one significant episode, such as the sending of a letter, the arming 
of a warrior, the departure for battle.  Episodes consist of a sequence of 
events that take place in roughly the same order whenever they appear, with 
optional elements.  The other aspect is the significance that the episode has 
in the total story, in other words, where it fits in the larger structure.  We 
may suppose then that themes are episodes that have internal sequential 
structure.  Thus we can model themes by supposing them to be rule-
governed; the parameters that provide their structure we will term “discourse 
structure rules.”  The set of rules that define the structure of a genre or text 
type we will term its “discourse grammar.”  Discourse structure rules define 
the structure of the episode in that they give the order of its constituent 
events, or the sequence of items in a description.  Note that we are not 
necessarily supposing that all the sub-episodes are in a fixed order; only that 
some of them are.  We shall have more to say about this later.   
The events in a theme also have an integrity in terms of what they 
contribute to the whole.  Lord declares that all songs are made from a finite 
set of themes.  This perspective suggests that the plot of a song is created out 
of independently existing themes and that different songs use the same 
themes.  This is to suppose that singers have learned a finite set of discourse 
structure rules and do not need to learn new ones in order to sing new songs.  
286 KOENRAAD KUIPER 
 
 
It would probably be too simplistic to equate themes exactly with the 
constituents of discourse structure rules, since Parry and Lord do not think in 
this way about epic poems.  However, themes and discourse constituents are 
not so different that we could not regard the latter as a model of the 
structural aspects of the former.   
If we compare the themes of oral heroic poems with the narratives of 
sports commentators, similar theme-like episodes can be found.  The face-
off episode in an ice hockey game has a particular characteristic part to play 
in the events of the total game (Kuiper and Haggo 1985).  In the speech of 
ice hockey commentators, the way the face-off is called can be given a 
formal representation by a set of rules.  Similarly, the description of the lot 
has a unique role in an auction (Kuiper and Haggo 1984).   
Let us suppose that discourse structure rules are an explicit model of 
what have traditionally been called themes.  Since they are explicit, they 
have both the advantages and disadvantages of explicitness.  There is a loss 
of mystique and a greater empirical vulnerability.  But such proposals also 
have greater predictive power.  That power can be put to the test.  All the 
discourse structure rules examined in Smooth Talkers (Kuiper 1996) and 
elsewhere, such as Salmond (1976) and Pawley (1991), are of the same 
general kind.  They are context-free rewrite rules, which have particular 
mathematical properties.3  They are a formal means of generating or 
explicitly characterizing ordered hierarchical structures.  They look like this: 
 
A —> y + z 
 
Such a rule states that there is a constituent, e.g., a section of discourse A 
that consists of two sub-constituents y and z that occur in that order.  In this 
rule, A is called a non-terminal symbol since it is not at the bottom of the 
hierachical structure, whereas y and z are terminal symbols.  Where a 
grammar consists of a number of such rules, i.e., where the hierarchical 
organization of the discourse consists of more than one level, non-terminals 
may appear on both sides of the arrow as follows: 
 
A —> B + C 
B —> w + x  
C —> y + z 
 
In this grammar A, B, and C, are non-terminals and w, x, y, and z are 
terminal symbols.  The difference between terminal nodes and non-terminal 
                                           
3 See, e.g., Gross and Lentin 1970. 
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nodes is that the former are the end of the line, as it were.  There is no 
substructure possible below them whereas non-terminal nodes have 
additional structure below them. 
Having made these formal distinctions, we can explore the discourse 
grammars of oral-formulaic speech more explicitly.  First, the kind of rules 
we have looked at above propose that all discourse sequences in a theme will 
be strictly ordered.  That is not always the case.  Free order sequences are 
permitted in some varieties of formulaic speech.  In discourse structure rules 
square brackets are used to enclose such sequences.  For example, in  
commentaries on ice hockey matches, every now and then a commentator 
will relate a face-off episode.  In such an episode the linesman, an official, 
drops the puck between two players in order to restart the game.  The 
discourse grammar for the face-off is rigidly sequential, but that grammar is 
embedded in larger episodes of the game.  It seems that these larger episodes 
are, in many cases, not structured by discourse structure rules because the 
play is not routine enough to allow it to be coded into discourse structure 
rules.  Putting it differently, there are aspects of ice hockey that allow for 
free and relatively unordered play.  Such play is still related using formulae 
since such patterns, as will be seen later, code significant episodes of a 
formulaic variety.  In the case of ice hockey, some of these episodes are 
serial in nature: for example, a series of passes from one player to another.  
In such a sequence, formulae will be used to describe the passes.  The same 
can be observed in the case of some of the episodes of cricket commentaries 
(Pawley 1991).  As a result, the context-free rewrite rules that account for 
discourse structure with free order sequences are not as restrictive as they 
are in the grammar of English, for example, where words cannot be put into 
free order sequences. 
None of the discourse grammars underlying a formulaic variety of 
speech that I have investigated is recursive.  The recursive property of 
context-free grammars allows them to embed structures within structures ad 
infinitum.  For example, in the grammar of English it is possible to embed 
possessive phrases inside one another in the following way.  We can say 
“My father’s brother’s sister’s mother’s aunt’s car’s door’s handle’s. . . .”  It 
seems that such embedding, where it takes place in the discourse structure of 
formulaic speech, has limits.   
In such genres any non-terminal constituent that appears on the 
righthand side of one discourse structure rule appears on the lefthand side of 
one and only one other rule.  Therefore the rules that have a particular non-
terminal node on their lefthand side appear higher in the grammar than those 
with that node on their righthand side.  For example, in the discourse 
structure of auctions, there is a constituent for the description of the lot.  
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This constituent appears on the righthand side of the rule that gives the top 
structure of the auction.  In turn, the description of the lot constituent 
appears on the lefthand side of the rule, giving the internal structure of the 
lot description, for example, in the livestock auction grammar.  The 
conventions for these rules are as follows: the arrow can be paraphrased as 
“consists of;” the parentheses enclose optional structural elements; the 
square brackets enclose free order sequences as indicated above. 
 
Auction —> description + opening bid search + bidcalling + sale + 
(epilogue) 
 
Description —>  [provenance + number] + [(history) + (preparation) + 
(potential) + . . . .] 
 
Figure 1: Discourse structure rules of auction speech 
 
The restriction limiting non-terminal elements to being on the righthand side 
of the arrow in only one rule has the effect of stipulating that the degree of 
embedding allowed by a set of rules is limited by the number of rules in the 
discourse grammar that have non-terminal nodes.  The depth of each non-
terminal constituent is also unique, since, under these limitations, the same 
constituents always appear at the same level of embedding.  Suppose, for 
example that we have a discourse grammar with the following rules: 
 
A —> B + C 
B —> E + (F) + G 
E —> a + b 
F —> c + d + e 
G —> f 
 
 
In such a situation B is always and only the first sub-section of A; G is 
always and only the final sub-section of B, and so on.  Such a restriction on 
a context-free grammar has as the consequence that the discourse grammar 
is not fully recursive, except in so far as the rules allow repetition of the 
same constituent.  That occurs in the commentaries of horse races, where, if 
the race were to go on forever, the cycle constituent in the commentary that 
names the horses in the order in which they are currently running would be 
repeated forever (Kuiper and Austin 1990). 
Second, there appears to be a general constraint on discourse 
grammars that will not allow them to have any more than four or perhaps 
five levels of structure.  In the case of race-calling, each cycle is contained 
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within the structure of the whole race commentary.  In the discourse 
grammar of North Canterbury livestock auctions, the structure has only three 
levels, as can be seen from Figure 1 (Kuiper and Haggo 1984:209).  The 
distance from highest constituent to lowest goes from Auction (the highest 
level) to Description of the lot (the next level down) to Provenance, where 
the lot comes from and the lowest level of discourse structure.  Thus the 
three levels. 
In oral heroic poems such as the Iliad, there are constituents of the 
story that recur embedded in other episodes.  For example, Homer’s heroes 
in the Iliad arm themselves for battle.  When they do so, there is a small 
discourse grammar that supports the description (Thornton 1984:100-3).  
Since these arming sequences appear inside other sequences, the arming 
grammar is embedded in a higher structure, but even here it seems that the 
levels of embedding are limited to four.  The highest-level constituent is the 
poem as a whole.  Below this, if Thornton is correct (46-63), there is a 
constituent for one of the journeys back or forth from the shore to the walls 
of Troy in which the Greeks fight their way to the walls of Troy or are 
beaten back to their ships by the Trojans.  Below that there is, say, the battle 
between Achilles and Hector, part of which is the arming sequence; at the 
bottom we find the putting on of the greaves.  This structure consists of five 
levels of constituents and four levels of embedding.   
 
 
 The Iliad 
 
 
 
 
          Journeys from the ships to the walls of Troy and back 
 
 
 Achilles vs. Hector 
 
 
 Arming sequence 
 
 
 Donning greaves 
 
Figure 2: The hierarchical structure of the Iliad 
 
290 KOENRAAD KUIPER 
 
 
The arming episode also usefully illustrates an earlier point.  Arming 
constituents in the Iliad recur.  People arm themselves or are armed at 
various times, but on each occasion the arming sequence is at the same level 
within the structure of the poem.  There are, to put it differently, no 
insertions of minor battles within the sequence of a warrior being armed.  It 
is, by contrast, perfectly possible to imagine that kind of insertion happening 
in a modern novel. 
Self-embedding of discourse grammar constituents is also impossible.  
There are never auctions within auctions, descriptions of the provenance of 
cattle within descriptions of the provenance of cattle, arming sequences 
within arming sequences.  The result of this set of constraints on the 
discourse structure rules of formulaic speech is that they build rather flat 
structures.  In some cases this results from the events themselves having a 
linear character.  For example, while the commentator of a horse race may 
call horses repeatedly, he will use an iterated structure rather than an 
embedded one.  Auctions have the same linear character.  On sale day, one 
sale succeeds another and in an individual auction one bid succeeds another.  
This point about linearity is made in general for oral forms by Ong 
(1982:37-38).  But in other cases it appears to be the result of the way oral-
formulaic performance utilizes human memory. 
The four properties just mentioned—the lack of true recursion and of 
self-embedding, the relatively low level of embedding, and the possibility of 
iteration—can be seen as a consequence of the theory of oral-formulaic 
performance proposed in Smooth Talkers (Kuiper 1996), namely that 
formulaic varieties of speaking can be used as a way of mitigating the effects 
of limited short-term memory in certain high pressure situations.  Iterated 
structures are flat while embedded structures are not.  If a speaker is under 
working-memory pressure in performance, the flatter the structure that the 
speaker has to produce, the better.  The reason for favoring flatter structures 
is that the greater the depth of structure, the greater the burden on working 
memory.  In a heavily embedded structure, the speaker must remember 
where in the higher structure he or she is while going through the lower 
structure.4  It is likely that auctioneers, race callers, and oral poets will want 
to save as much working memory space as possible and will therefore use 
discourse grammars that are as efficient as possible in this respect.  Making 
do with shallow structures meets this goal.  Performers of heroic poems 
cannot do without some structural depth, since their texts are much longer 
                                           
4 There is evidence from the theory of the parsing of syntactic structure in 
linguistic performance that human memories and processors have a preference for flat 
structure (Frazier and Clifton 1996, Marcus 1980).  
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than those of race callers and auctioneers.  They also do not appear to be 
under quite the same working-memory loading from external sources as race 
callers and auctioneers.  They have no race to watch or goods to sell, but 
they do have a complicated tale to relate from long-term memory.  They 
therefore have the memory resources to manage a certain amount of 
structural depth. 
To summarize, the discourse structure of formulaic varieties of speech 
has three formal properties.  It can be modeled by context-free rewrite rules.  
These rules do not permit self-embedding, and allow other forms of 
embedding down to four levels only.  The rules do allow for iteration and 
therefore tend to build relatively flat structures. 
 
 
Formulae 
 
Formulaic speech appears to be inextricably bound up with using 
lexicalized phrases.  Most scholars of oral-formulaic performance take as 
their starting definition of the formula that of Milman Parry quoted by Lord: 
“a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical 
conditions to express a given essential idea” (1960:30).  The metrical 
element of this definition derives from the properties of the formulaic 
tradition in which Parry was working.  Since we know that Old English 
alliterative poetry is in part formulaic but its meter is accentual, we might 
loosen Parry’s definition to include the possession of rhythm as a defining 
property.  However even this hypothesis proves too strong.  Not all formulae 
in all formulaic varieties of speech have a rhythm that is different from 
normal speech rhythm.  This leaves us with a definition specifying only a 
group of words expressing an essential idea—not a precise definition.   
Lord suggests that “the most stable formulas will be those for the most 
common ideas of the poetry.  They will express the names of the actors, the 
main actions, time, and place” (34).  He also suggests that the “group of 
words” part of the definition can be augmented by supposing that formulae 
have a kind of slot and filler grammar: “We immediately begin to see that 
the singer has not had to learn a large number of separate formulas.  The 
commonest ones that he first uses set a basic pattern, and once he has the 
basic pattern firmly in his grasp, he needs only to substitute another word for 
the key one” (36).  An interesting use of this concept is a study by Fry 
(1975) that shows how a pagan set of formulae can be converted to Christian 
usage by small changes in the fillers for particular slots.  It seems that 
formulae have both syntactic and lexical properties, as well as a relationship 
with the sites in which they are employed in the composition of oral epic.  
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However, scholarship in the field of oral-formulaic performance has not 
helped to make the theory of the formula much more precise.  For example, 
Lord (1986) covers a range of scholarship related to the formula, but there is 
little increase in precision of definition.5  
Linguistically a formula is a lexical item that is phrasal in character 
rather than being just a single word; that is, it has syntactic structure.  It is 
held in long-term memory by a speaker or a community of speakers.  In this 
way formulae are like idioms.  But they also have an additional property.  
Each formula has idiosyncratic conditions of use.  It does particular work for 
a speaker in a particular situation; specifically, in the case of oral poetry, it 
performs the kinds of discourse functions Lord alludes to above.   
Since formulae are lexical items, their properties should be 
demonstrable.  Like all lexical items, formulae show both arbitrariness of 
form and idiosyncrasy of behavior.6  The arbitrariness of form exhibits itself 
in the fact that while some formulae have variants, there are many ways 
other than these of saying the same thing, ways that oral-formulaic 
performers do not use.  For example, in the face-off in ice hockey 
commentaries, the expression “get the draw” is formulaic whereas “aim for 
the draw” is not.  In race calling the loop formulae that one caller uses to 
signal that he is moving from the last runner in the field back to the first 
runner include “round the Showgrounds bend they come,” but not “round 
the Showgrounds bend they trot.”  An auctioneer will ask towards the end of 
the bidding “Any more bids?”  But he will not ask, “Has anyone a further 
bid?”7  Pawley and Syder suggest that, given the infinite number of possible 
ways a language provides for saying something, in many cases native 
speakers select only one or two characteristic ways of saying it.  Formulae 
are such ways of saying things in a “nativelike” way. 
However, formulae are not without variant forms.  In a real estate 
auction (see Kuiper 1996), the auctioneer (Rod Cameron) calls bids in the 
following ways (where X is a dollar value): 
 
1. I have X dollar bid 
 I have X dollars 
 X dollars 
 X 
 
                                           
5 See, for a further example, Russo 1976. 
  
6 Arbitrariness of form is regarded by Di Sciullo and Williams (1987) as 
diagnostic of lexical items. 
 
7 For a detailed discussion, see Pawley and Syder 1983 and Pawley 1985.  
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2. At X dollars 
 At X 
 
If we look at these two sets of data, each can be seen as consisting of 
variants of a single formula in much the same way as Lord’s “systems” are 
(1960:35).  Lord illustrates one such system as follows: 
 
          kuli  
       a  u            dvoru    
                 ku¶i 
 
Such systems are arbitrary in form and in their lexical selection since we can 
think of many other syntactically well-formed variants that do not occur.   
How should we explain such arbitrary variation in formulae?  Let us 
look again at the variants in 1 and 2 above.  In each case some of the 
elements are compulsory and some optional.  At first glance it might appear 
that each variant has a separate lexical entry just like a single word.  
However, to suppose that would be to ignore the family resemblances 
among the different variants.  We can account for these family resemblances 
by supposing that formulae are generated, that is, given explicit structural 
description, by finite state grammars without loops.  Such grammars look 
like this: 
 
start    X     stop 
 
 
        I have         dollars               bid 
 
start  at  X              stop   
 
 
               dollars 
 
Figure 3: Finite state representation of two bid-calling formulae 
 
Finite state diagrams not only provide a model of these two formulae 
but of very many formulae.  Here are some of the formulae for describing 
face-offs in ice hockey: 
{ 
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       the face-off 
 
 
start  X  take      the draw     stop 
 
 
              it 
 
              waved           away 
 
             stop 
start  X  is        out  of the circle 
 
      thrown 
 
Figure 4: Finite state representation of face-off formulae 
 
 
If formulae have finite state properties, we can explain why some variants 
appear and others do not.  The reason is that only those forms that can be 
generated by the finite state diagrams are available variants.  If formulae 
were freely generated syntactic structures, then we would expect many more 
variants to appear than actually do.  Formulae share this property of having a 
restricted set of variants with idioms that are also phrasal lexical items.8  
Though formulae may be modeled as finite state diagrams, they also have a 
grammatical category: they are noun phrases or verb phrases.  Speakers must 
know what the grammatical category of a formula is because formulae can 
and do fit into a grammatical position when they are not a full sentence. 
None of this precludes a formula from being reanalyzed in its entirety 
as a normal syntactic structure.  Formulae are, for the most part, normal in 
their syntactic properties.  What is being claimed is that oral-formulaic 
performers normally store formulae and use them in a finite state form.  
Someone who is not familiar with the formula as formula will parse it as 
they would any other structure, since there is often nothing about a formula 
that tells those who do not know it that it is a lexical item.  On occasion 
someone who is familiar with that fact will nevertheless reanalyze it, making 
up new versions for rhetorical effect. 
                                           
8 See further Weinreich 1969, Chafe 1968, Fraser 1970, and Di Sciullo and 
Williams 1987. 
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A further lexical property of formulae is that they frequently do not 
mean what they say; that is, they are semantically non-compositional.  The 
traditional formula to end bidding at an auction—“going once, going 
twice”—does not mean what it says.  The lot is only going to be sold once, 
not two or three times.  The formulae of cricket commentaries are almost all 
non-compositional.  Cricket commentators talk about a ball being “on the 
leg” as in “so and so gets this ball on the leg.”  In cricket the field of play is 
divided symmetrically into the “on” side and the “leg” side.  A ball bowled 
“on the leg” is on the leg side of the midline dividing the field of play.  It is 
not on the person’s leg at all nor is the person’s “leg stump,” another 
technical formula, the stump of the person’s leg.  What this actually means 
in turn needs an explanation that would, if a cricket enthusiast were 
explaining it, involve further non-compositional formulae.  Such examples 
could, we predict, be found in all varieties of oral-formulaic speech.  
Formulae are thus not only ways of saying but ways of seeing, being 
interdependent parts of a semantic network of relationships that constitute 
the knowledge one has of an area, such as a sport or the Trojan War. 
We are now in a position to see the connection between discourse 
structure rules, whose formal properties we looked at earlier, and formulae.  
A defining property of formulae is that they are indexed to particular 
constituents of the discourse structure rules.  Any formula appears to be tied 
to one—and only one—constituent of the discourse structure.  This linkage 
makes formulae in oral-formulaic speech unambiguous in their discourse 
function.  Speaking metaphorically, we could say that formulae are stored on 
file cards with one, and only one, index.  If formulae are seen in this way, 
then the discourse structure rules have a dual aspect; they model the high-
level structure of the discourse but, perhaps more significantly, they anchor 
every formula to its appropriate place in the discourse.   
If formulae have the structure of indexed finite state diagrams, and 
given the hypothesis initially proposed by Lord that formulaic speech is a 
response to the pressures of real-time performance (including, in the terms 
we discussed earlier, subject to internal and external constraints on such 
speech), then it should be the case that using formulae makes it easier for 
speakers under working memory pressure to speak fluently.  Let us suppose 
that all the features of oral-formulaic speech reduce the range of choices 
available to the speaker.  In the case of formulae, we can clarify as follows.  
Speakers who reach a particular point in the discourse have at their disposal 
a number of formulae, each of which is a finite state diagram.  The choice of 
formula is not functionally significant, but it is stylistically important.  To 
remain interesting, speakers must not say exactly the same thing every time 
they open their mouths at a particular point in the discourse.  The choice is 
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therefore first among the various formulae that have the same discourse 
index, and then, secondly, which particular path that a speaker takes in the 
finite state diagram.   At each point the number of choices is small and finite, 
so that using formulae does exactly what we have supposed needs to be done 
under working memory pressure.  It sharply limits the speaker’s linguistic 
resources.  It also means that what the speaker says will be contextually 
appropriate if the discourse structure rules are followed for the kind of 
discourse that the current context requires.  A race caller will produce an 
appropriate account during the running of a race if he follows the discourse 
rules and inserts the contextually determined names of horses into the 
formulae he is using. 
Compare this process with the hypothesis that speakers construct 
sentences compositionally.  Here the number of available choices is infinite.  
No doubt speakers can and do, from time to time, use linguistic resources in 
this way, but they do not seem to do so in the case of oral-formulaic speech. 
We can conclude that oral-formulaic performers replace the act of 
processing speech with looking up formulae wherever possible.  Where 
processing is necessary, they use the look-up procedure to give themselves 
time to do what processing needs to be done. 
We have now defined the linguistic aspect of the formula in some 
detail.  We have had nothing to say about the metrical properties that have 
exercised some literary scholars of heroic epic.  The reason for that omission 
is that metrical properties do not seem to be necessary properties of all 
formulae.  That is not to say that in particular oral traditions, such as those of 
oral poets, meter may not be significant.  It clearly is.  But the necessary 
properties of formulae are their finite state syntax and their discourse 
indexing. 
 
 
The Drone 
 
In many oral traditions, speaking or singing with a strong tonal center, 
or droning, is the basic prosodic mode in which the performer performs.  
Different oral traditions ornament this tonal center in different ways, 
generally in a fairly predictable fashion.  In part this predictability is part of 
the tradition; in part it is idiosyncratic to different performers.  What is 
important for the foregoing is that a strong tonal center and a high degree of 
predictability in the prosodic ornamentation of oral-formulaic speech lead to 
the limitation or focusing of linguistic resources that characterizes such 
speech. 
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Fluency and Abnormal Fluency 
 
Normal conversational speech is fluent.  Speakers speak at an average 
rate of five to six syllables per second and often with little hesitation 
(Bolinger 1975:496).  Generally the speech of oral-formulaic performers is 
abnormally fluent.  Its speech usually averages out to conversational speed 
but, unlike conversational speech, it has an abnormally even articulation 
rate, a lack of hesitation phenomena such as voiced or unvoiced pausing, an 
absence of filler expressions such as “you know,” and an absence of false 
starts.  Not all oral-formulaic speech has all these features (Kuiper 1996).  
We can attribute the abnormal fluency of formulaic performers to the fact 
that they make heavy use of recall rather than constructing utterances from 
the ground up.  While one is speaking from memory, the hesitation 
phenomena that indicate the uncertainties of speech planning are absent. 
 
 
Situations, Formulae, and Oral Traditions 
 
I now turn to the final area in which further explication might be 
sought, the general relationship between the text and its context.  Consider 
first “what Bauman refers to . . . as an ‘interpretative frame,’ [which Foley] 
prefer[s] to call the performance arena, understanding by that term the locus 
in which some specialized form of communication is uniquely licensed to 
take place” (Foley 1995:8).  We have seen that discourse structure and 
formulae are intimately related and that reasonably precise theories can be 
constructed as to how this happens.  But what of the discourse structure, 
formulae, and their relationship to the non-linguistic context?  In this regard 
it is salutary to recall Sherzer’s admonition (1983:18): 
 
There is the relationship between speaking patterns and the other 
sociological patterns found in a society—social organization, political, 
ecological, economic, or religious.  There are anthropological theorists 
who would always see one of these aspects of a society as basic.  Such a 
view would always have speech patterns be secondary, superficial 
reflections of the more basic structure.  But in many situations in many 
societies speaking has a structure of its own which can play a major role in 
defining, determining, and organizing sociological structures.  
 
 
The most likely source within linguistics for a theory of how this may take 
place is the ethnography of communication and, more specifically, the 
theory of register.  A register is usually conceived of as dealing with those 
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varieties of a language some of whose features are situationally determined 
or correlated—a situated discourse, in other words.  Since formulae are 
linguistic units whose conditions of use are situationally determined, the 
frameworks for ethnography of communication and register studies should 
yield useful analytic tools for exploring what I will term “pragmatic 
indexing.”   
There exist a sizeable number of situational classifications from which 
one might draw suggestions for how speakers code pragmatic indexes.  
These should be seen in the light of the comment by Biber that “despite the 
number of register studies that have been completed to date, there is still 
need for a comprehensive analytical framework.  Such a framework should 
clearly distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic characterisations” 
(1994:31).  Here I will consider only the non-linguistic characterizations, 
since I explored the linguistic properties of formulae earlier.  Such 
characterizations can be of two kinds: analytic frameworks or taxonomies 
devised by the ethnographer for describing situated discourse, or theories as 
to the nature of the communicative events that native speakers have 
internalized and that constitute aspects of their native-like communicative 
competence.9  These two approaches do not necessarily come up with 
different answers, but their objectives are dissimilar.  For the objective I 
have set, the second approach is to be preferred.  I am not so much interested 
in an analytic framework as a theory of the nature of pragmatic indexing. 
To put things a little differently, let us suppose that part of a native 
speaker’s communicative competence involves the learning of a set of 
phrasal lexical items.  Some of these will be formulae.  Attempting to give a 
descriptively adequate account of formulae therefore requires a theory of 
how formulae are entered into the native lexicon, that is, explaining how 
formulae are native-like component parts of certain communicative events.  
That is to suppose that each formula is a kind of micro-register.  So is it 
possible to discover restrictive theories of such micro-registers that have the 
explanatory power of the linguistic constraints that we have proposed above 
in limiting the world of the possible where formulaic speech is concerned? 
Regrettably, in our current state of knowledge, the answer seems to be 
that it is not.  If it were, then there would exist general parameters that 
“define the frames of perception which constitute the boundaries between 
socio-cultural domains and along which natives determine to which socio-
cultural categories linguistic units belong” (Herdt 1980:197).  By looking at 
standard examples such as arming formulae in Homer, we can see that a 
search for general constraints on the pragmatic indexing of formulae is 
                                           
9 See Hymes 1974, Pawley 1985, and Sherzer and Darnell 1972.  
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futile.  Each formula is indexed for a specific constituent of the discourse 
structure rules, but these rules are culture-specific.   
If we look at the kinds of frameworks that have been constructed for 
performing analyses of situational constraint,10 none provide constraints as 
to what a possible pragmatic index might include.  For instance, they do not 
preclude the possibility that a formula might be indexed for the haircolor of 
the speaker or for whether or not the addressee is wearing contact lenses.  
Instead, they provide fairly open-ended frameworks that analysts of the 
situational context of speech can use as checklists for the general areas in 
which pragmatic indexing may be found.  In other words, in our current state 
of knowledge it is not possible to say what constraints exist on the pragmatic 
indexing of formulae. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The speech of formulaic performers is constrained both from within, 
by human memory and processing capacities, and externally, by the routine 
tasks that formulaic speakers must perform.  In turn, these constraints make 
it advantageous for speakers to select speech that makes do with limited 
resources.  Formulaic speech employs discourse structure rules and formulae 
with formal properties that limit what can be said.  It employs unusual 
prosodic modes.  As a result, speakers who utilize formulaic modes of 
speech speak with extraordinary fluency.11  What has been shown above is 
that by looking in a precise way at each of these linguistic features of oral-
formulaic speech, particularly at the formal properties of discourse structure 
rules and formulae, we can get a clearer picture of some of the mechanics of 
an oral-formulaic tradition.  We can also delimit formulaic speech from 
other varieties of speech, since the formal constraints we have been able to 
place in discourse structure rules and formulae do just that.   
Using formulae according to their discourse indexing limits a 
performer’s options, allowing speech in circumstances where performance 
constraints limit a speaker’s ability to be highly creative.  Formulaic speech 
also consists of a prosodic tradition, a way of speaking or chanting that 
makes speaking simpler by limiting the performer’s options in this area.  
The employment of these two parts of the linguistic tradition results in an 
unusually fluent performance.  I have suggested, however, that we cannot 
                                           
10 E.g., Hymes 1974, Crystal and Davy 1969, Biber 1994, and Coulmas 1979. 
  
11 This theory is the burden of Kuiper 1996.    
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yet make precise predictions about the ways in which the non-linguistic 
conditions of use for formulae are coded in the mind of the speaker. 
What practical consequences do these findings have for those working 
in the field of oral literature?  They allow for formulae to be seen not just as 
underlined sections of (transcribed) text but as mental representations of an 
abstract structure that can give rise to a small, finite number of instantiations 
of the formula.  In such cases the formula is, in fact, the finite state 
representation rather than a particular form of words.  The findings also 
suggest that discourse structures can be represented by a system of rules that 
performers follow and that explain some of the properties of their 
performances in a testable fashion.   
In practical terms, the theories presented above allow students of oral 
literature to construct dictionaries of formulae represented as finite state 
systems.  They also allow for the structure of works of oral literature to be 
represented as discourse grammars.  But these are only beginnings.  The 
microstudy of a specific oral tradition reveals that different performers make 
idiosyncratic use of the discourse rules and the inventory of formulae. 
Careful study would show how an individual performer uses the 
discourse grammar and which particular paths he or she prefers through a 
finite state system of a particular formula.  In this way the theoretical claims 
made above can be turned into a way of uncovering both the tradition and an 
individual performer’s accessing of it.  Take, for example, the highly 
characteristic prosodic patterns used in the oral traditional performances of 
tobacco auctioneers in the American South.  Kuiper and Tillis (1986) have 
noted the macro features of the tobacco auctioneers’ chant tradition, but, as 
far as I know, no one has studied the idiosyncratic implementations of that 
tradition by individual auctioneers.  Even the study of specific performers is 
at the level of generalization.  We know that no two performances are ever 
identical.  The theoretical claims made earlier allow for the discourse 
structure rules and formulae of one performer to be studied in their detailed 
implementation at particular times and places.  Furthermore, the longitudinal 
study of a performer’s gradual induction into a tradition and subsequent 
development as a performer within it would benefit from looking, for 
example, at the ways in which the discourse structure rules become 
articulated and the flexibility of finite state systems expands as the performer 
becomes more experienced.   
I hope that the theories presented in this study will give rise to greater 
precision in the discussion of formulaic speech and will allow those who 
work on formulaic performance traditions to understand them better and to  
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utilize the formalisms presented here to gain greater understanding of both 
the macro- and the micro-levels of formulaic performance.12 
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